Traducción de María S. Ciruzzi.

Tomo I.

War cannot be controlled in future without an understanding of its past. These essays analyse war, its strategic characteristics and its political and social functions, over the past five centuries. Makers of Modern Strategy , first pub lished in 1943, deserved and demanded updating. The 28 essays in the new vol ume7 more than in the original range from excellent to outstanding. They reflect the skills of a cross-section of leading military historians. But re viving a classic is a difficult task. Some original contributions were discarded, some rewritten, some left virtually in tact. Old and new frequently coexist awkwardly, as when Hajo Holbom and Gunther Rothenberg compete for 19th- century Germany. The editors'' reluc tance to impose a common format add ed to an intellectual diffusion most visible in a split between biographic and thematic approaches. As a result, this revision cannot equal its predecessor''s status as a standard text. As an antholo gy, however, the work is brilliantly suc cessfuland that is no mean achieve ment. Recommended for all students of military history. Dennis Showalter, History Dept., Colorado Coll., Colora do Springs Copyright 1986 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Pavel Podvig This encyclopedic book provides comprehensive data about Soviet and Russian strategic weapons, payloads, and delivery systems and on the nuclear complex that supports them. The data are drawn from open, primarily Russian sources. All the information is presented chronologically, arranged by individual systems and facilities, and is not available elsewhere in a single volume. Following an overview of the history of Soviet strategic forces, the book discusses the structure of the political and military leadership in the Soviet Union and Russia, the structure of the Russian military and military industry, nuclear planning procedures, and the structure of the command and control system. It describes the nuclear warhead production complex and the Soviet nuclear weapon development program. It then focuses on the individual services that constitute the so-called strategic triad--land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, the strategic submarine fleet, and strategic aviation. It presents an overview of Soviet strategic defense, including air defense systems, the Moscow missile defense system, the radar and space-based early warning networks, and the space surveillance system. The book also includes a description of the Soviet nuclear testing program, including information on test sites and on all Soviet nuclear tests and peaceful nuclear explosions. It concludes with a look at the future of strategic nuclear weapons in Russia.

The Bear Went Over the Mountain is a collection of vignettes written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences fighting the Mujahideen guerrillas. The material was originally collected and published by the Frunze Combined Arms Staff College to serve as a text on combat against a guerrilla force in mountain-desert terrain. It was originally intended for internal use only and as such provides examples of both good and bad military practice. The hard lessons learned are not specifically ''Russian'' in nature and many of the same mistakes and successes would apply equally to the American Army in Vietnam. Indeed, the knowledge gained from these reports should also apply to future conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rugged terrain. This is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan War, but rather a series of snapshots of combat as seen by young platoon leaders, company commanders, battalion commanders and military advisers. It is an intimate look at the boring, brutal business of counterinsurgency punctuated by moments of heady excitement and terror. Colonel Grau, the editor and translator, has added his own commentary to produce a useful guide for commanders to meet the challenges of this kind of war and to help keep his fellow soldiers alive. This book will also be of interest to the historian and general reader, who will discover that advances in technology have had little impact on this kind of war, and that many of the same tactics the British Army used on the Northwest Frontier still apply today.

The Chance Vought F7U Cutlass was ahead of its time In 1948 when it first flew it could hardly have been more exotic or state of the art a tail less fighter to be powered by two afterburning jet engines It was not only to be carrier based but also climb quicker and be faster than the Air Force s new swept wing North American F 86 Sabre Developmental problems resulted in it taking too long to reach operational squadrons which partly accounts for its relatively unsuccessful career The Cutlass was designed too soon to benefit from the discovery of the area rule which doomed it to transonic performance in level flight Similarly its lack of a horizontal tail was intended in part to address the transonic pitch control difficulties being encountered at the time but they proved to be avoidable with one Unfortunately no horizontal tail resulted in it not only being radical in appearance but also having challenging handling qualities at approach speed The F7U 3 s service introduction was also accomplished before the Navy perfected a rigorous process for transitioning pilots to new airplanes particularly important in the case of the Cutlass and its unusual handling qualities one of which resulted in a rare aeronautical phenomenon the post stall gyration It was

The development of field armies has involved much more sophistication than generally supposed. In both practice and theory, army operations have been as knowledge-based and intellectually rigorous as any academic discipline, ensuring them an enduring place as a practical means of applying massive force. Fortunately, the NATO attempt to replace conventional armies with nuclear technology was never tested in a real war. But English suggests that the likelihood of deterrence continuing in war, because of its transmutability, also offers hope that it can be controlled in the future, as it was in the past, by social forces. This book offers a longer, more realistic view of war than that normally embraced by technocrats in search of better weapons and peacemakers in search of utopia. This book also addresses in detail the questions of why armies became so large and why war itself transmutated. The technological transformation of war that occurred after 1815 is discussed, in turn, for the effect it exerted upon the future operations of armies. A novel perspective on the tactical and operational progression of warfighting up to the end of World War II is also provided through an examination of modern defensive theory. On a more elevated plane, the book critically assesses the ways in which nuclear deterrence ultimately affected NATO''s defensive posture in central Europe. Also subjected to detailed scrutiny are the theoretical and practical dimensions of ground force concepts for the defense of the NATO central front. Finally, English evaluates ground force operations in the Gulf War with a view to drawing relevant conclusions and lessons for the future.