Edward N. Luttwak

Si quieres la paz, prepárate para la guerra. El aumento del número de armas ofensivas puede ser algo puramente defensivo. La peor carretera puede ser el mejor camino a la batalla. Edward Luttwak nos enseña que la estrategia esta compuesta de proposiciones como estas, aparentemente contradictorias, en un ejemplo de la logica paradojica que domina todo el ambito del conflicto.En este libro ampliamente elogiado, que se presenta en una edicion revisada y aumentada, Luttwak desvela la particular logica de la estrategia nivel a nivel, desde la tactica de combate a la gran estrategia. A traves de su participacion directa en la planificacion de la guerra del Golfo, el autor examina el papel del poderio aereo desde 1991, para luego señalar la aparicion de la "guerra postheroica" en Kosovo, en 1999, durante una guerra estadounidense en la que no murio ni un solo soldado estadounidense.Tambien se nos explica la dinamica de la inversion en el conflicto. Cuando la victoria se convierte en derrota por exceso de extension, cuando la guerra trae la paz por agotamiento, se esta subvirtiendo la logica lineal habitual. Mediante los ejemplos que se citan, desde la antigua Roma hasta nuestros dias, desde la Operacion Barbarroja y el bombardeo de Pearl Harbor hasta las menores escaramuzas, desde la estrategia de la paz hasta los ultimos metodos operativos de la guerra, este libro, escrito por una de las mayores autoridades mundiales en la materia, revela la enigmatica logica del exito y del fracaso militar, la extraña logica de la paz y de la guerra.

A well-known writer on strategic defense, Edward N. Luttwak is the author of several books, notably "Coup d''Etat", which has been translated into twelve languages, "Dictionary of Modern War", and "The Political Uses of Sea Power" (John Hopkins).He is now Research Professor at the Georgetown University and Senior Fellow of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies.

At the height of its power, the Roman Empire encompassed the entire Mediterranean basin, extending much beyond it from Britain to Mesopotamia, from the Rhine to the Black Sea. Rome prospered for centuries while successfully resisting attack, fending off everything from overnight robbery raids to full-scale invasion attempts by entire nations on the move. How were troops able to defend the Empire's vast territories from constant attacks? And how did they do so at such moderate cost that their treasury could pay for an immensity of highways, aqueducts, amphitheaters, city baths, and magnificent temples? In The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, seasoned defense analyst Edward N. Luttwak reveals how the Romans were able to combine military strength, diplomacy, and fortifications to effectively respond to changing threats. Rome's secret was not ceaseless fighting, but comprehensive strategies that unified force, diplomacy, and an immense infrastructure of roads, forts, walls, and barriers. Initially relying on client states to buffer attacks, Rome moved to a permanent frontier defense around 117 CE. Finally, as barbarians began to penetrate the empire, Rome filed large armies in a strategy of "defense-in-depth," allowing invaders to pierce Rome's borders. This updated edition has been extensively revised to incorporate recent scholarship and archeological findings. A new preface explores Roman imperial statecraft. This illuminating book remains essential to both ancient historians and students of modern strategy.